Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification

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


Motivating Example:


Computation as a Service


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
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


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









Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification





Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification

Folding Scheme

For NP-language \mathcal{L} with relation $\mathcal{R} = \{(x, v) \mid v \text{ is a proof that } x \in \mathcal{L}\},$ folding scheme FS which

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Combines instances:

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{Fold} \colon ((x_1,v_1),(x_2,v_2)) \to (x,v,\pi) \\ (x,v) \in \mathcal{R} \Longleftrightarrow (x_1,v_1), (x_2,v_2) \in \mathcal{R} \end{array}$

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- Check statement inclusion FoldVerify: $(x_1, x_2, x, \pi) \rightarrow 0/1$ 1 if π is proof that x_1 and x_2 were folded into x

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Example

For
$$A \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times m}$$
; $\mathcal{L}_A = \{x \mid \exists v \colon Av = x\}.$

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Example

For
$$A \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times m}$$
; $\mathcal{L}_A = \{x \mid \exists v : Av = x\}$.
• Fold $((x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2))$:
 $\rho \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}; \pi = \rho;$
 $x = x_1 + \rho x_2; \quad v = v_1 + \rho v_2.$

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• Fold(
$$(x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2)$$
):
 $\rho \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}; \pi = \rho;$

 $x = x_1 + \rho x_2;$ $v = v_1 + \rho v_2.$

• FoldVerify (x_1, x_2, x, π) : check that

$$x = x_1 + \rho x_2.$$

Folding Scheme: Security

Example

Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification

Folding Scheme: Security

• **Completeness**: No Adv. can output input to Fold in \mathcal{R} , which gives output not in \mathcal{R} (or invalid folding proof).

Example

• Completeness: $(x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2) \in \mathcal{R}$ then

$$Av = A(v_1 + \rho v_2) = Av_1 + \rho Av_2$$
$$= x_1 + \rho x_2 = x$$

Folding Scheme: Security

- **Completeness**: No Adv. can output input to Fold in \mathcal{R} , which gives output not in \mathcal{R} (or invalid folding proof).
- Knowledge Soundness: From Adv. giving x_1, x_2, x, v, π where $(x, v) \in \mathcal{R}$ and π is accepted, we can extract witness for x_1, x_2 .

Example

• Completeness: $(x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2) \in \mathcal{R}$ then

$$Av = A(v_1 + \rho v_2) = Av_1 + \rho Av_2$$
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■ Knowledge Soundness: Run to get x, v, π = ρ and x', v', π' = ρ' for same input.

$$v = v_1 + \rho v_2$$

$$v' = v_1 + \rho' v_2$$

$$\Rightarrow v_2 = (\rho' - \rho)^{-1} (v' - v)$$

From 2-folding to 4-folding

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Output of Fold is in $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \textbf{Bootstrapping}$

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(x_1, v_1) (x_2, v_2) (x_3, v_3) (x_4, v_4)

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From 2-folding to 4-folding

Output of Fold is in $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \textbf{Bootstrapping}$

$$(x', v', \pi')$$

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 (x_1, v_1) (x_2, v_2) (x_3, v_3) (x_4, v_4)

From 2-folding to 4-folding


Output of Fold is in $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \textbf{Bootstrapping}$

$$(x', v', \pi') \qquad (x'', v'', \pi'')$$
Fold
$$(x_1, v_1) \qquad (x_2, v_2) \qquad (x_3, v_3) \qquad (x_4, v_4)$$

Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification


From 2-folding to 4-folding

Output of Fold is in $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow$ **Bootstrapping**




From 2-folding to 4-folding

Output of Fold is in $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow$ **Bootstrapping**



From 2-folding to 4-folding

Output of Fold is in $\mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \textbf{Bootstrapping}$



From 2-folding to *n*-folding


Bigger binary tree construction or:

- **1** Fold $((x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2)) \rightarrow (x', v', \pi')$
- 2 Fold($(x', v'), (x_3, v_3)$) $\rightarrow (x'', v'', \pi'')$ and let $\pi = (\pi', \pi'')$.


3 ...


4 Fold
$$((x^{(n-2)}, v^{(n-2)}), (x_n, v_n)) \rightarrow (x, v, \pi^{(n-1)});$$


 $\pi = (\pi', \pi'', \dots, \pi^{(n-1)})$



Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification








Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification

Idea

Generate *n* proofs π_i , each containing $O(\log n)$ folding proofs and statements.

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


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Example

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$$\pi_1 = \{x_2, x', \pi', x'', x, \pi'''\}$$



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
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
$$\pi_1 = \{x_2, x', \pi', x'', x, \pi'''\}$$


$$\pi_2 = \{x_1, x', \pi', x'', x, \pi'''\}$$

$$\pi_3 = \{x_4, x'', \pi'', x', x, \pi'''\}$$


$$\pi_4 = \{x_3, x'', \pi'', x', x, \pi'''\}$$







Motivating Example: Verifiable Computation as a Service



Idea

Folding scheme hiding others' statements.

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NP statement hider

Hide each instance (x, v) as another instance (x', v') and generate certificate cthat x' hides x. More on these later

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Example

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$$\pi_1 = \{x'_1, c_1\}$$

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•
$$\pi_4 = \{x'_4, c_4\}$$

Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification

$$\begin{array}{c} (x'_1, v'_1, c_1) \ (x'_2, v'_2, c_2) \ (x'_3, v'_3, c_3) \ (x'_4, v'_4, c_4) \\ & \uparrow \\ & \downarrow \\ & \downarrow \\ (x_1, v_1) \ (x_2, v_2) \ (x_3, v_3) \ (x_4, v_4) \end{array}$$

Idea

Folding scheme hiding others' statements.


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$$\pi_1 = \{x'_1, c_1, x'_2, x', \pi', x, \pi'''\}$$
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$$\pi_4 = \{x'_4, c_4, x'_3, x'', \pi'', x, \pi'''\}$$



Security of Privacy Preserving FS

IND-CMA flavor:

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Security of Privacy Preserving FS

IND-CMA flavor:

Adv choose input with 2 options for entry *j*

$$\begin{array}{ccc} (x_1, v_1) & (x_2^0, v_2^0) & (x_3, v_3) & (x_4, v_4) \\ & & (x_2^1, v_2^1) \end{array}$$

Security of Privacy Preserving FS

IND-CMA flavor:

- Adv choose input with 2 options for entry *j*
- **2** Entry j chosen at random

$$\begin{array}{cccc} (x_1,v_1) & (x_2^0,v_2^0) & (x_3,v_3) & (x_4,v_4) \\ & & (x_2^1,v_2^1) \\ & & b \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\} \end{array}$$

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Security of Privacy Preserving FS

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
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Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification

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
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Security of Privacy Preserving FS

IND-CMA flavor:

- Adv choose input with 2 options for entry j
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- 4 Adv chooses index ℓ and receives π_ℓ

 $Adv \longleftarrow \pi_1$



Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification


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IND-CMA flavor:

- Adv choose input with 2 options for entry *j*
- 2 Entry *j* chosen at random
- **3** Everything is hidden and folded
- 4 Adv chooses index ℓ and receives π_ℓ
- **5** Guess which (x_j, v_j) was used

$$b' \longleftarrow \operatorname{Adv} \longleftarrow \pi_1$$

Win if b' = b



NP statement hider

$$(x, v) \longrightarrow$$
 Hide $\longrightarrow (x', v', c)$

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- Completeness
- Knowledge Soundness

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 - (x_0, v_0) (x_1, v_1)

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 $(x', v') \rightarrow \text{Adv}$

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Claim

Composing a Folding Scheme with an NP statement hider gives a Folding Scheme with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification.

Folding with random instance

To hide (x, v):

1 Generate random instance (x_r, v_r) .

2 Fold:

$$(x',v',\pi) \leftarrow \mathsf{Fold}((x,v),(x_r,v_r))$$

3 Output $(x', v', c = (\pi, x_r))$.

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Recall

Example

$$\mathcal{L}_{A} = \{x \mid \exists v \colon Av = x\}$$

Fold($(x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2)$): $\rho \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}; \pi = \rho;$ $x = x_1 + \rho x_2; \quad v = v_1 + \rho v_2.$

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1 Generate random instance in
$$\mathcal{R}$$
 as $v_r \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}^m$; $x_r = Av$.

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Fold($(x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2)$): $\rho \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}; \pi = \rho;$ $x = x_1 + \rho x_2; \quad v = v_1 + \rho v_2.$

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Example

1 Generate random instance in \mathcal{R} as $v_r \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}^m$; $x_r = Av$.

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Folding with random instance

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Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification

Example is secure

Can Adv distinguish if (x, v)hides (x_1, v_1) or (x_2, v_2) ?

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Assume (x, v) hides (x_1, v_1) using (x_r, v_r) :

$$\begin{aligned} x &= x_1 + \rho x_r \\ v &= v_1 + \rho v_r. \end{aligned}$$

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$$\begin{aligned} x &= x_1 + \rho x_r \\ v &= v_1 + \rho v_r. \end{aligned}$$

(x, v) is equally likely to hide (x_2, v_2) if there is $(x'_r, v'_r) \in \mathcal{R}_A$ such that:

$$x_2 + \rho' x'_r = x_1 + \rho x_r$$

 $v_2 + \rho' v'_r = v_1 + \rho v_r.$

Example is secure

Can Adv distinguish if (x, v)hides (x_1, v_1) or (x_2, v_2) ?

Assume (x, v) hides (x_1, v_1) using (x_r, v_r) :

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(x, v) is equally likely to hide (x_2, v_2) if there is $(x'_r, v'_r) \in \mathcal{R}_A$ such that:

$$x_{2} + \rho' x_{r}' = x_{1} + \rho x_{r}$$
$$v_{2} + \rho' v_{r}' = v_{1} + \rho v_{r}.$$

So we must have

$$\begin{aligned} x'_r &= (\rho')^{-1}(x_1 + \rho x_r - x_2) \\ v'_r &= (\rho')^{-1}(v_1 + \rho v_r - v_2) \end{aligned}$$

Example is secure

Can Adv distinguish if (x, v)hides (x_1, v_1) or (x_2, v_2) ?

Assume (x, v) hides (x_1, v_1) using (x_r, v_r) :

$$\begin{aligned} x &= x_1 + \rho x_r \\ v &= v_1 + \rho v_r. \end{aligned}$$

(x, v) is equally likely to hide (x_2, v_2) if there is $(x'_r, v'_r) \in \mathcal{R}_A$ such that:

$$x_{2} + \rho' x_{r}' = x_{1} + \rho x_{r}$$
$$v_{2} + \rho' v_{r}' = v_{1} + \rho v_{r}.$$

So we must have

$$x'_{r} = (\rho')^{-1}(x_{1} + \rho x_{r} - x_{2})$$
$$v'_{r} = (\rho')^{-1}(v_{1} + \rho v_{r} - v_{2})$$

But is this in \mathcal{R}_A ?

Example is secure

Can Adv distinguish if (x, v)hides (x_1, v_1) or (x_2, v_2) ?

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$$x_{2} + \rho' x_{r}' = x_{1} + \rho x_{r}$$

$$v_{2} + \rho' v_{r}' = v_{1} + \rho v_{r}.$$

So we must have

$$\begin{aligned} x_r' &= (\rho')^{-1} (x_1 + \rho x_r - x_2) \\ v_r' &= (\rho')^{-1} (v_1 + \rho v_r - v_2) \end{aligned}$$

But is this in \mathcal{R}_A ?

$$\begin{aligned} Av'_r &= A(\rho')^{-1}(v_1 + \rho v_r - v_2) \\ &= (\rho')^{-1}(Av_1 + \rho Av_r - Av_2) \\ &= (\rho')^{-1}(x_1\rho x_r - x_2) \\ &= x'_r \end{aligned}$$

Example is secure

Can Adv distinguish if (x, v)hides (x_1, v_1) or (x_2, v_2) ?

Assume (x, v) hides (x_1, v_1) using (x_r, v_r) :

$$\begin{aligned} x &= x_1 + \rho x_r \\ v &= v_1 + \rho v_r. \end{aligned}$$

Theorem

There is a folding scheme with privacy preserving selective verification for $\mathcal{L}_A = \text{Im}(A)$.

(x, v) is equally likely to hide (x_2, v_2) if there is $(x'_r, v'_r) \in \mathcal{R}_A$ such that:

$$x_{2} + \rho' x_{r}' = x_{1} + \rho x_{r}$$
$$v_{2} + \rho' v_{r}' = v_{1} + \rho v_{r}.$$

So we must have

$$\begin{aligned} x_r' &= (\rho')^{-1} (x_1 + \rho x_r - x_2) \\ v_r' &= (\rho')^{-1} (v_1 + \rho v_r - v_2) \end{aligned}$$

But is this in \mathcal{R}_A ?

$$\begin{aligned} Av'_r &= A(\rho')^{-1}(v_1 + \rho v_r - v_2) \\ &= (\rho')^{-1}(Av_1 + \rho Av_r - Av_2) \\ &= (\rho')^{-1}(x_1\rho x_r - x_2) \\ &= x'_r \end{aligned}$$

Conclusion

NP statement hider

If there is a folding scheme for \mathcal{L} , \mathcal{R} supports efficient random sampling, and for any three instances $(x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2), (x, v) \in \mathcal{R}$ there are equally many ways to fold (x_1, v_1) into (x, v) as there is to fold (x_2, v_2) into (x, v), then there is an NP statement hider for \mathcal{L} .

Conclusion

NP statement hider

If there is a folding scheme for \mathcal{L} , \mathcal{R} supports efficient random sampling, and for any three instances $(x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2), (x, v) \in \mathcal{R}$ there are equally many ways to fold (x_1, v_1) into (x, v) as there is to fold (x_2, v_2) into (x, v), then there is an NP statement hider for \mathcal{L} .

Privacy Preserving Folding Scheme

As above: There is a Privacy Preserving Folding Scheme for \mathcal{L} .

Conclusion

NP statement hider

If there is a folding scheme for \mathcal{L} , \mathcal{R} supports efficient random sampling, and for any three instances $(x_1, v_1), (x_2, v_2), (x, v) \in \mathcal{R}$ there are equally many ways to fold (x_1, v_1) into (x, v) as there is to fold (x_2, v_2) into (x, v), then there is an NP statement hider for \mathcal{L} .


Privacy Preserving Folding Scheme


As above: There is a Privacy Preserving Folding Scheme for \mathcal{L} .

Languages

We show that this is satisfied by folding schemes schemes for

- Inner Product Relation of Committed Values [RZ23]
- Committed Relaxed R1CS [KST22]





Thank you for listening.



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[B**E**24]

Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification Joan Boyar & Simon Erfurth

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